Viet Nam: The strategic situational analysis, the NY Times fear sharing 7/1/2014

Viet Nam: The strategic situational analysis, the NY Times fear sharing 7/1/2014

see Google map for Chinese oil rig current position

The Nubian Observer

Beijing leadership will face a major political threat to it's power if  it orders the 137 ships to turn around and return home.

Beijing leadership had pressed the point of no political return in terms of going into block 118 and 119 Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. The only political question left is when and under what terms. Because Beijing elected to make the oil rig deployment a high profile media event, nationalism and false proud is taking hold of events pushing them of Beijing leadership control.

Nubian Observe intelligence analysis suggest the Chinese oil rig taskforce is really going to the ExxonMobil block 118 to conduct physical detailed seismic analysis and test drillings in order to locate and  see if Chinese oil and gas companies can trap into the eastern most end of the massive Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. As a fall back option, China is looking to see if the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field or one of its sister fields extends into block 142 and/or block 143.

If having failed to located scaled oil or gas in or near the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field, Beijing will be faced with public humiliation and be forced to either retreat or push on passed the nine-dash line into the politically sensitive ExxonMobil oil and gas hoping to pick up a seismic tail of a oil and gas field extending back to the nine-dash line. This will trigger a White House response. The US Chinese lobby will not be able to save Beijing from American nationalism.

Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP) reveals real motive of oil rig

According to the Institute for Security and Development Policy  “It has been suggested in the international media, in this regard, that China's positioning of CNOOC 981 (also referred to as HYSY981) near the Paracels on May 2 could be, in part, linked to Vietnam's 2013 announcement of its intention to build a US$20 billion power plant to be supplied by oil and gas from Vietnamese Blocks 118 and 119, which are adjacent to where CNOOC 981 is deployed. As for the Philippines' latest stated intentions in Reed Bank, it is unclear if Beijing would, in the short term, retaliate by having CNOOC announce its own plans to develop this area. Given, however, those Chinese vessels have in the past disrupted Forum Energy's operations there, they will most likely do so again if operations resume”.

MIT analysis

On Thursday may 8,2014 , M. Taylor Fravel, an associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, answered questions from The New York Times on the latest events off the coast of Vietnam. He studies China’s territorial issues and is the author of “Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes,” published by Princeton University Press. He posts on these issues on Twitter under @fravel.

Q.

Why is China trying to place an oil rig at this time in this location?

A.

The most likely reason is political and not economic. Economically, the area where the rig will drill has few proven or probable hydrocarbon reserves. Moreover, the rig, which cost $1 billion to build, is extremely expensive to operate on a daily basis, which begs the questions why Cnooc would explore in an area with uncertain prospects.

Q.

Given what has occurred in the last week and the history of the struggle between China and Vietnam over the Paracels, could this situation escalate into a more intense or larger conflict?

A.

The risk of escalation is real. Offshore oil and gas play an important role in Vietnam’s economy. This gives Hanoi a strong incentive to deter China from operating within Vietnam’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) even if this particular area may not hold large reserves. The proximity to both countries facilitates the deployment of naval forces and government maritime law enforcement forces. The prospect of many ships jostling for control of a small area increases opportunities for miscalculations and collisions that could escalate into armed conflict.

In the past few years, Vietnam has demonstrated a willingness to use its government ships to challenge what it views as assertive Chinese behavior threatening its interests. In 2007, Vietnam sought to prevent China from conducting a seismic survey in waters near the Paracel Islands, north of where the rig is located. In 2010, Vietnamese vessels surrounded a Chinese patrol ship from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration in disputed waters. Now, the stakes are even higher for Vietnam, which suggests it may choose to continue with efforts to prevent China’s rig from commencing drilling operations.

Q.

How committed is China to using the “nine dashes” in the Republican-era map as the basis for its territorial claims in the South China Sea?

A.

Although the nine-dashed line has appeared on Chinese maps for decades, China has maintained a curious silence on the meaning of the line. China has never stated what the line depicts, either positively or negatively. The line could represent a claim to sovereignty over the enclosed land features or it could be much more expansive and represent a claim to an EEZ or historic rights (both of which would be inconsistent with Unclos.)

Within China, disagreement exists over how to define the line. Nevertheless, Chinese actions in the past few years, such as protecting fishermen in the southern reaches of the South China Sea or inviting foreign oil companies to invest in exploration blocks off the coast of Vietnam, indicate that China may favor a more expansive definition.

The MIT error
Analysis: professor Fravel is in gross error about the “nine dashes” Chinese territorial claims in terms of Viet Nam and the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. The eastern most part of Vietnam's blocks 118 and 119 fall within China's so-called nine-dash line, a boundary Beijing uses on its official maps to show its claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea. The ExxonMobil owned and operated Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field is purportedly closer to the Viet Nam, further west and outside of the nine-dash line claimed by China. The third well, called 118 Ca Voi Xanh-3X, was performed on the second quarter 2012 and ended up with positive results since ExxonMobil encountered a higher proportion of hydrocarbons. ExxonMobil does not give any indications about the nature and size of the resources discovered in the block 118 or open  analysis all data relating to it location. Only physical detailed seismic analysis and test drillings will confirm that the Ca Voi Xanh field does not extend into the eastern region of block 118 and 119 east of the nine-dash line in Chinese territorial claimed region of the ExxonMobil blocks.

If any part of the massive Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field is found in the Chinese claimed section of block 118, Chinese oil and gas companies will aggressive to trap into the eastern most end of the massive Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field.

US Space Command, Japan, NATO, India, Viet Nam, Russian and Chinese satellites are streaming in real time the progress of the Chinese oil rig taskforce of 137 ships is slowly making its way toward the Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. The critical issue is not where the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field, but the shape and eastward extend of the oil and gas field.

Advanced elements of a missile armed and submariner escorted Chinese oil rig taskforce are in range of the ExxonMobil owned and operated Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. No one is sure what will happen if and when the Chinese enter block 118 and 119. There is a de facto western media blackout of reporting the progress of the fleet movement toward the ExxonMobil. The Japanese press and Google are streaming the location of the Chinese fleet; no western media i.e. RT.com, the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times or BBC have offered its readership the location of the Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. Reporting is limited to the various ramming events.

ExxonMobil is planning to used natural gas from block 118 to fuel a 20 billion dollar gas powered industrial power grid to power 40 per cent of south Viet Nam. For political and business design Viet Nam and ExxonMobil have left most of blocks 118 and 119 purposefully undeveloped making Chinese exploration and production in the region nearly impossible.

The Chinese oil rig will be hard press to find oil and natural, short of exploration in or near the massive Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. China has been studying the ExxonMobil development of the massive Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field and has timed their mass Chinese oil rigs deployment just ahead of the next phase of ExxonMobil development. The first Chinese oil rig is tracking alone a narrow project seismic trail from block 142 and 143 to the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field in block 118 and 119.

Nubian Observe intelligence analysis suggest the Chinese oil rig taskforce is really going to the ExxonMobil block 118 to conduct physical detailed seismic analysis and test drillings in order to locate and  see if Chinese oil and gas companies can trap into the eastern most end of the massive Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. As a fall back option, China is looking to see if the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field or one of its sister fields extends into block 142 and/or block 143.

If having failed to located scaled oil or gas in or near the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field, Beijing will be faced with public humiliation and be forced to either retreat or push on passed the nine-dash line to the ExxonMobil oil and gas hoping to pick up a seismic tail of a oil and gas field extending back to the nine-dash line. Beijing will have no political pretext to employ. The moment of truth will be upon Beijing to make a strategic decision about naked aggression and war. The nationalistic element within Beijing leadership will mount a serious political struggle to seize the Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field anyway, once near the field in force. Viet Nam, USN and the world community will be watching the whole affair on Internet streamed video.

The French Warning

French general Daniel Schaeffer, an expert on Chinese issues, gave the interview after a conference on issues surrounding the Spratly and Paracel islands held in Danang from June 19-21

What do you think is the worst-case scenario? a half-clash

According to general Schaeffer “I don’t believe the worst scenario will occur. At the most, it may be something like a “half-clash”. This is because if a war broke out, the US would be compelled to intervene, and then both China and the US would suffer great losses. That might be equivalent to the World War II. Moreover, traffic on the waterways of the East Sea are three times busier than the Suez Canal and six times busier than the Panama Canal. It wouldn't be in China's, or any other nations', best interest to go to war.”

The brief the New York Times fears reporting

Advanced elements of a missile armed and submariner escorted Chinese oil rig taskforce are in range of the ExxonMobil owned and operated Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. China‘s strategists and policy makers are fairly new to major power geopolitics, and have not learned the lessons their American and Russian counterparts learned during the Cold War: that escalation is a dangerous tool, that an adversary can respond in very unpredictable ways, and that tension can quickly spiral out of control.

One problem on the near horizon is how China will react to Vietnamese resistance in Block 118 and 119. Beijing will certainly react, and will again seek to punish Viet Nam and strengthen China‘s claims in the process. One option would be for the rig to stop near China's so-called nine-dash line, a boundary Beijing uses on its official maps to show its claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea and the eastern section of which Vietnam's Blocks 118 and 119 fall within the  China’s nine-dash line.

Another more likely and more provocative response would be to evict the Vietnamese naval forces currently in front of the massive Chinese taskforce. China has already harassed routine efforts by the Vietnamese Coast Guard to rescue disable ships and may seek to tighten the blockade on the Vietnamese ships in order to force the Vietnamese to withdraw. The potential for shots to be fired or another ship to be rammed and sunk would be high, and lives may be lost.

 Without serious engagement, even without finding oil or gas, China is unlikely to back down. Beijing will paint these issues as directly related to its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Beijing may elect to order a small oil rig and taskforce to remain on station in block 118 daring Viet Nam to attack.

 Beijing cannot risk being viewed as weak in the face of foreign exploitation by ExxonMobil —strongly suggests that China‘s leaders are sensitive to linkages between perceived weakness abroad and instability at home. With the growth of China‘s economy likely to slow dramatically in coming years, Beijing appears to see incidents like these as useful in stirring nationalist sentiments at home to buttress the popular legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Should China use force against Viet Nam, particularly ExxonMobil, no matter how much Beijing may try to describe the act as defensive or reactive, the United States would probably be drawn into the crisis—certainly in a diplomatic sense, and potentially in a military sense as well.

When China first announced the deployment of its oil rig, it stated that its operations would terminate on August 15. This provides plenty of time for both sides to orchestrate and manage the confrontation in Block 143 and provide a face saving means for ending the confrontation. Following Beijing meetings between Chinese state owned oil and gas majors and ExxonMobil in June, Beijing leadership ordered the deployment of five more oil rig naval protected  and missile armed groups to waters off Viet Nam. Beijing also order the first oil rig taskforce to moving through block 142 and 143 toward the ExxonMobil owned and operated Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. The forward elements of the first Chinese oil rig taskforce is within 100 miles of the Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field.

According to The Diplomat, “Diplomatic sources in Beijing also report that CNOOC officials revealed they were ordered to place the rig in Block 143 despite their misgivings on commercial grounds. CNOOC officials pointed to the costs of keeping the rig on station until mid-August when oil exploration is scheduled to cease. Other observers point out that the prospects of finding commercial reserves of oil and gas in this area is quite low”. So why four oil rig naval taskforces with hundreds of ships and submarines?

The massive Chine oil rig and naval escort of 137 ships is slowly making course via block 142 and 143 toward the massive and strategic ExxonMobil blocks 118 and 119 south of Da Nang, Viet Nam into a Vietnamese missile kill zone. A resisting Vietnamese Coast Guard naval force of 40 ships is being compressed against the Vietnamese’s coast losing critical tactical space. Currently, the rig is 240 km (126 miles) off the Vietnam's coast and 330 km (206 miles) from the southern coast of China's Hainan Island. More importantly, the naval taskforce is less than a 100 miles from the ExxonMobil Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field.

High speed Chinese missile ships in the advanced elements of the Chinese taskforce are within four hours sail time of the ExxonMobil Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. Unknown numbers of Chinese missile armed submariners are embedded with the taskforce. The eastern most part of Vietnam's blocks 118 and 119 fall within China's so-called nine-dash line, a boundary Beijing uses on its official maps to show its claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea.

The Phu Khanh Basin is viewed by China as part of these contested waters, while Vietnam and ExxonMobil see the promising blocks 117, 118 and 119 offshore Da Nang along the central coast of Vietnam as legally clear for further  development.

The third well, called 118 Ca Voi Xanh-3X, was performed on the second quarter 2012 and ended up with positive results since ExxonMobil encountered a higher proportion of hydrocarbons. ExxonMobil does not give any indications about the nature and size of the resources discovered in the block 118 until analyzing all data.

The first Chinese taskforce in tracking directly toward the Phu Khanh Basin

USAF Space Command Thai and Viet Nam radar stations are part of an American network watching Chinese political insurgency in near Da Nang is real time streaming. Nubian Observer suggest the oil rig speed is a political function of Beijing and may slow down due to events in Iraq.

As stated above, ExxonMobil is planning to used natural gas from block 118 to fuel a 20 billion dollar gas powered industrial power grid to power 40 per cent of south Viet Nam. By political and business design Viet Nam and ExxonMobil have left most of blocks 118 and 119 purposefully undeveloped making Chinese exploration and production in the region nearly impossible.

Chinese exploration teams will use the known location of the third well called 118 Ca Voi Xanh-3X as a physical reference point to grid the eastern section of block 118 hoping to find a higher proportion of hydrocarbons.

The Saudi factor, Viet Nam ace in the hold

The lust of Iraq oil exports will force China to turn to the Saudis for increased shipments. Saudi Arabia is warning China about its brinkmanship toward Viet Nam in term Beijing and Tehran can understand. It is Saudi own interests that China not be allow to take the ExxonMobil Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field  and the Saudis has  the oil weapon to enforce their political will.

It’s highly unlikely that a big Chinese oil deal s will make the Saudis more amenable to sanctions against Viet Nam.  Saudi’s position on Viet Nam is not based solely on its energy relationship Saudi leadership would argue that its broader interests  in Viet Nam is [about] protecting national sovereignty and preventing a strong power from coercing a weaker one. The Saudis know firsthand the ruthless nature of Beijing.

United States political posturing by design is keeping  Beijing guessing

The deployment of the five Chinese oil rigs following formal meetings in Beijing between ExxonMobil CEO and Chinese oil leadership suggests a hardening of ExxonMobil and de facto White House position about not sharing the Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field with Chinese oil companies. The second wave of five rigs deployment evidence the powerful nationalism element within Beijing leadership, even in the face of the Iraq crisis, which is not accounted for in Professor Farley or other analysis. Beijing has made it clear, if all else fails, seizing the ExxonMobil Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field is a military option. While ExxonMobil is an international corporation and not a US aircraft carrier, it political roots are American and the White House has made it clear, its business interests will be defended by US military force, if necessary. Short of ExxonMobil attacking Chinese naval forces, the United States and ExxonMobil are inextricably locked in the Middle East and Pacific Rim’s system of international trade.

Cobra Gold 2014 for Viet Nam, US deterrent

One of the primary political functions of the Cobra Gold 2014 was to send China and its Drug cartels a clear military message. This year's exercise by design was in Phitsanulok province of Thailand and then move to other northern provinces, the northeastern province of Khon Kaen and the eastern provinces of Chon Buri, Rayong and Chanthaburi to simulate a massive drug clearing military operation of United Wa State Army (UWSA) operations near the Thai border.

The Cobra Gold exercise returns to its "heavy year" drill this year. It involved mock warfare on land, in the water and in the air as well as live-fire exercises. Cobra Gold allowed the USAF Space command to show off its new satellite elements. The U.S. Space Based Infrared (SBIR) satellite system, which is designed to identify heat signatures in real time, can and has detected exploding aircraft. A select group of foreign guests and military planners were allowed to view in real time the operations of the Chinese drones and Chinese backed The United Wa State Army (UWSA) deployments and operations in real time on the Thai border. Missing from the Cobra Gold 2014 drill was the massive simulated deployment of USAF attack drones, able to deal with both UWSA and Chinese regional forces with Thai Air and ground forces.

Such a real deterrent would require means to sustain pro-active suppression Chinese long range missile threat. For political reasons, Thai and American leadership are not ready to take that strategic step. Will current Viet Nam crisis change the matrix of thinking? The infrastructure is in place in Viet Nam and the region. The only question is political will and strategic timing.

What the White House cannot and should not confirm

China without political or military cause, Beijing broke off its naval brinkmanship against the Philippines and repositioned its South China Sea navy as a shield near home. The Nubian Observer suggests the USAF Space Command Thai radar stations were part of an American network watching for a Chinese political insurgency event and feared a attack on the war games, which was evidence by the increase US force and combat readiness of the force deployed and forward positioned Vietnamese air mobile special forces at the Da Nang air based less a hour flight time away. The Chinese forward naval deployments near Viet Nam are designed to counter US morbidly evidences in the Cobra Gold exercise. That is a rapid deployment of US military force to central and southern Viet Nam would de facto cut of the Chinese South China Sea navy already staining to maintain forward force deployments.

Nubian Observer Executive Summary

The Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field is out of range all but long range advanced Chinese land based missiles and missile armed submariners. To address this critical missile issue, China has embedded within the five oil rig naval escort taskforces missile armed boats and Chinese Aegis ships. The rig oil forward positioning of antimissile counter measures extend the Chinese missile interception foot print, adding a new antimissile layer while seriously reducing the numbers of older Vietnamese missiles to survive transition to the second phase of flight.

 Clausewitz and the defense of the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field

The defense of the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field is not defined by its physical location, but by the Chinese naval forces attacking it. The number one goal is to reduce the Chinese forward missile interception foot print in the East Sea in order to protect the Vietnamese missile counter strike in the event of war. In order to attack the Chinese Aegis forward network, a near surface missile corridor will have to be cut between a Vietnamese missile boat and the Chinese Ageis command center.

Chinese Aegis allows Chinese antimissile general staff clear command and control of the flight and interception of incoming Viet Nam missile strikes from southern Viet Nam near Da Nang.

The rig oil forward positioning of antimissile counter measures extend the Chinese missile interception foot print, adding a new antimissile layer while seriously reducing the numbers of older Vietnamese missiles to survive transition to the second phase of flight. Chinese antimissile general staff is moving the five oil rigs around Viet Nam like chess pieces, looking for strategic and tactical opportunities to exploit.

 The Chinese Aegis ship and/ or support communication network ships must be identified and destroyed by high speed Vietnamese missile armed Special Forces boats in close range of the taskforce in the early period of the conflict. The approach to the oil and gas fired must be mined forcing the taskforce to break up and move into predesigned kill zones. The large Chinese navy ships and mine clearing ships must be taken out of the mission. The smaller Chinese ships shielding the larger ships must be left if tactical possible in order to save limited missiles for other strategic targets.

If China can bait Viet Nam into firing missiles on the Chinese naval taskforce in the East Vietnamese Sea, China will have the political pretext required to launch a massive submariner based retaliation missile strike suppressing, downgrading and/ or destroying  the Vietnamese land, sea and air defenses protecting the Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. With the Vietnamese missile deterrent downgrade in the Da Nang region, the Chinese naval taskforce or it replacement already just a day sail away, could easily seize physical control of the ExxonMobil Ca Vio Xanh oil and gas field and if need be Da Nang. Without land based missile cover, counter attacking Vietnamese naval forces would be easy targets for Chinese missiles.

The power of Chinese Aegis ships
To address the physical limitations of their Russian imported advanced S-300 and S-400 antimissile batteries this critical missile issue, China was forced to embedded within the five oil rig naval escort taskforces missile armed boats and Chinese Aegis ships.

Military chess game, Chinese style

Beijing is playing a military chess game with Vietnamese and ExxonMobil strategic planners hoping for a wrong move, so the Chinese military has a pretext to  start a war. Each of the new oil rigs have a naval component, some large and some small, all are designed to create pressure on Vietnamese outer borders and test the nerves of Hanoi leadership. Only two Chinese oil rigs are really looking for oil and gas, these two rigs are moving closer and closer to the ExxonMobil blocks 117,118 and 119, now less a few days sail and only hours for high speed Chinese missile boasts and submariners.

Beijing has to date failed  to bait Hanoi into an emotional based  missile attack on any of  the deployments of five new Chinese oil rigs with naval task forces near or in striking distance of the ExxonMobil Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field. Viet Nam greatest test is just ahead. Its appears from intelligence analysis, the main Chinese rig taskforce will be allowed to push up to the China nine-dash line look around finding no oil or gas and return to station in block 142 and 143.

The founder of the modern Vietnamese state, Ho Chi Minh, reportedly said before his death in 1969, “Colonialism is dying. The white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. As for me, I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life.”

The nine-dash line

A part of Vietnam's Blocks 118 and 119 fall within China's so-called nine-dash line, a boundary Beijing uses on its official maps to show its claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea.

Last year, Exxon and Viet state-owned Petrochem announced plans to build a US$20 billion power plant to be fuelled by reserves in those blocks. Chinese and international satellites know where the ExxonMobil oil and gas is and the distance to the nine-dash line from the oil and gas field. China claims are baseless.

The Nubian Observer suggests that if Viet Nam can resist being baited, the Chinese oil rigs taskforce will first move into the western most end of Chinese blocks 142 and 143 searching for evidence of a gas-prone structure. If they find one gas-prone structure, the hold political matrix will change and Beijing will deploy all its rigs to the region to develop oil and gas over the coming years. This political solution is not with great risk, but a necessary as a face saving operation for pro western Beijing leadership. Viet Nam will live to fight another season with two submariners and thousands of modern missiles and weapon systems.

If the two oil rig failed to find evidence of a gas-prone scaled oil and gas, which is likely the case, then Beijing may elect to forcibly take up positions in the Chinese tips of block 118 and 119 near the critical China's so-called nine-dash line, a boundary Beijing uses on its official maps to show its claim to 90 percent of the South China Sea and continue to search for oil and gas  while secretly looking for the outer limits of the Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field during the tycoon season or go home and come back next year leaving a sea based naval outpost on station.

 If having failed to located scaled oil or gas, Beijing will be faced with public humiliation and be forced to either retreat or push on passed the nine-dash line to the ExxonMobil oil and gas hoping to pick up a tail of a oil and gas extending back to the nine-dash line. Beijing will have no political pretext to employ. The moment of truth will be upon them to make a strategic decision about naked aggression and war. The nationalistic element within Beijing leadership will mount a serious political struggle to seize the Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field anyway, once near it in force. The USN and the world community will be watching the whole affair.

 The Vietnamese coastguard will be compression into the ExxonMobil blocks and the approaches to the blocks may be mined and a few Chinese ships maybe have be sank by mines and other Vietnamese counter means. Viet Nam and ExxonMobil will pressure the White House to physically place a small USN led international force between in the Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field as Viet Nam declares a military zone around the field. A larger theatre force of US, Japan, South Korean and Australia forces will be massed on standby as the Da Nang regional defense is layered.

Next Hold Your Breath Moment Coming

As the first elements of the China naval taskforce moves to the western end of blocks 142 and 143 the first and second “Hold Your Breath” moments happened with deployment of the first and second Chinese oil rig naval taskforces to the Da Nang region of Viet Nam setting the real time conditions for a war between Viet Nam and China. The deployment of the five Chinese oil rigs following formal meetings in Beijing between ExxonMobil CEO and Chinese oil leadership suggests a hardening of ExxonMobil position about not sharing the Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field with Chinese oil companies. The second wave of five rigs deployment evidence the powerful nationalism element within Beijing leadership, even in the face of the Iraq crisis, which is not accounted for in Professor Farley or other analysis. Beijing has made it clear, if all else fails, seizing the ExxonMobil Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field is a military option. While ExxonMobil is an international corporation and not a US aircraft carrier, it political roots are American and the White House has made it clear, its business interests will be defended by US military force, if necessary. Short of ExxonMobil attacking Chinese naval forces, the United States and ExxonMobil are inextricably locked in the Middle East and Pacific Rim’s system of international trade.

Iraq, cause to slow Chinese move on the energy rich ExxonMobil Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field

Southern Iraq is oil fields are a few missile attacks away from closing. China will lose over a million barrels of Iraq oil a day. The White House and ExxonMobil are leading an international cabal to address China oil crisis, this has divided Beijing leadership on the Viet Nam question.

Increase Chinese imported oil from Iraq and Iran was a strategic key to Beijing not having to deal with pro Viet Nam Saudi Arabia. One of the economic blow back effects of the collapsing Iraqi government is the reduction of long term oil from Iraqi to provide almost six million bpd to China. Now China is forced to turn to the Saudis and ExxonMobil for help. The Saudis may use the oil weapon to stop Beijing from starting a war with Viet Nam.

The U.S. reserve can hold the equivalent of about 95 days of imports, while China’s can probably now cover about 21 days, according to estimates by Amrita Sen, a London-based analyst with Energy Aspects Ltd., a research company.

Purchases for China’s strategic supply will pull 200,000 to 300,000 barrels a day of crude from the global market this year, CEBM Group, an independent investment advisory firm based in Shanghai, said in a March research note. Iraq is China’s fifth-largest overseas oil supplier, behind top producer Saudi Arabia (which last year provided 19 percent of the country’s 5.6 million barrels a day), as well as Angola, Oman, and Russia. Over the last five years, state-owned oil and gas giant China National Petroleum has rapidly expanded its presence in the Iraqi oil business. CNPC is now operating four projects in the as-yet-untouched southern part of the country, making it the single biggest foreign investor in Iraq.

Last year, CNPC produced 299 million barrels from Iraq, almost one-third of its overseas output.  Meanwhile, Chinese state enterprises, refiner Sinopec and offshore player CNOOC, have both made big investments in Iraq’s oil industry.

The lust of Iraq oil exports will force China to turn to the Saudis for increased shipments. Saudi Arabia is warning China about its brinkmanship toward Viet Nam in term Beijing and Tehran can understand. It is Saudi own interests that China not be allow to take the ExxonMobil Viet Nam Ca Voi Xanh oil and gas field  and the Saudis have the oil weapon to enforce their political will.

Saudis warning to Iran to not meddle in Iraq is a clear message to Beijing to also back off threading Viet Nam. As the final supplier of oil to China and only country able to replace Iraq oil exports, Saudi Arabia holds the oil  weapon that shapes the standoff between Viet Nam and China.

(Reuters) - Saudi Arabia gave an apparent warning to arch enemy pro Chinese Iran on Wednesday by saying outside powers should not intervene in the conflict in neighboring Iraq.

Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal also said Iraq was facing a full-scale civil war with grave consequences for the wider region.

His remarks coincided with an Iranian warning that Tehran would not hesitate to defend Shi'ite Muslim holy sites in Iraq against "killers and terrorists", following advances by Sunni militants there.

The toughening of rhetoric about Iraq by the Gulf's two top powers suggested that Tehran and Riyadh have put on hold recent plans to explore a possible curbing of their rivalry across the region's Sunni-Shi'ite sectarian divide.

Peace seeking leaders around the world have been working behind closed doors to reason with Beijing leadership in terms of the consequence of a war with Viet Nam. A possible break through is emerging in Iraq that may cause Beijing to rethink it brinkmanship in the East Sea with Viet Nam. A war with Viet Naw would potentially collapse world energy market and play right into the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. China’s Iraqi oil imports would be at serious risk alone with the central government.

Viet Nam is not out of the Chinese trap yet, but the Middle East has created new light at the end of the tunnel.

 

End summary